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IIASA STUDIES IN ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS NO. 138
EEP
The Evolution and Ecology Program at IIASA fosters the devel-
opment of new mathematical and conceptual techniques for un-
derstanding the evolution of complex adaptive systems.
Focusing on these long-term implications of adaptive processes
in systems of limited growth, the Evolution and Ecology Program
brings together scientists and institutions from around the world
with IIASA acting as the central node.
Scientific progress within the network is collected in the IIASA
Studies in Adaptive Dynamics series.
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A spate of recent investigations on reciprocation and social enforcement in humans has 
brought together (and sometimes divided) economists, psychologists, anthropologists, 
social scientists and evolutionary biologists, as well as neurologists and students of 
animal behaviour. Experimental work on public goods and social incentives has  
addressed a wealth of questions on the emotional and cognitive (proximal) factors, as 
well as on the genetic and cultural (ultimate) evolutionary  mechanisms involved in this 
essential aspect of human nature. This article surveys recent work, highlighting the role 
of punishment and reward in joint enterprises. 
 
INTRODUCTION: RECIPROCATION AND SOCIAL ENFORCEMENT 
 
How do humans manage to sustain collective efforts in sizable groups of unrelated 
individuals?  The topic is in fashion, but not new. In 1975, for instance, W.D. Hamilton 
closed his essay on ‘Innate Social Aptitudes of Man’ [1] with a section on ‘Reciprocation and 
Social Enforcement’. Humans have a special gift for reciprocation. However, in interactions 
involving more than two individuals, reciprocation works less well than in pair-wise 
encounters. Even defining it offers a non-trivial task. If your group contains a cooperator and 
a cheater, whom do you reciprocate with? Social enforcement, by contrast, works better in 
groups with more than two members, as Hamilton points out [1], and can offer ‘at least a 
partial cure’ for the problems with reciprocation in larger groups. ‘There may be reason to be 
glad that human life is a many-person game and not just a disjoined collection of two-person 
games’ [1]. 
 
Whereas pioneers of socio-biology were aware of the importance of public goods and 
punishment [1,2,3], recent cross-disciplinary contact between experimental economists and 
evolutionary biologists has greatly stimulated the field. Here, I review work focussing on  
incentives which promote cooperation in groups of unrelated humans. 
 
FINING FREE-RIDERS  
 
Let us begin with an experimental Public Good game. Six anonymous players are given $10 
each. They must decide whether to invest this in a common pool, knowing that the 
experimenter will triple the amount in the common pool, and distribute it equally among all 
six players, no matter whether they contributed.  
 
This game is easy to analyse. If all players contribute, they triple their accounts. However, 
each player is better off by not contributing, because only half the contribution returns to the 
account it came from (i.e. it is multiplied by three and then divided among the six players). If, 
as a consequence, no player contributes, then the initial amounts remain unchanged. This 
deplorable outcome of selfish motives is known variously as social dilemma, tragedy of the 
commons, free-rider problem, market failure… The multiplicity of the names points to the 
ubiquity of the issue. 
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In modern society, the exploitation of collective efforts (e.g. free-riding on public buses, 
shirking tax, dodging military service…) is punished by a plethora of institutions. Obviously, 
the threat of punishment deters would-be defectors. This can be mimicked by another 
experiment on Public Goods, this time with Punishment. In this two-stage game, the first 
stage runs exactly as before. In the second stage, players can impose fines upon their co-
players. These fines are collected by the experimenter and do not land in the punisher’s 
account. In fact, each punisher must pay a fee for the experimenter to collect the fine. 
 
Again, the analysis is easy. A player bent on maximizing income should not punish, because 
this is costly. Hence, nothing should happen in the second stage; thus, the first stage will be 
unaffected. No punishment, no contributions and no gains: the selfishly motivated inertia in 
both stages of the game leads to economic paralysis. 
 
Gratifyingly, this does not happen in real experiments, which are usually slightly more 
sophisticated versions in which players can choose between different levels of contribution 
and sizes of fines. In seminal experiments by  Fehr  and Gächter [4][5], the average 
contribution of players, in the Public Good game without Punishment, was slightly >50% of 
their endowment. In the Public Good game with Punishment, it was higher – close to 60%. 
Punishment was usually targeted on defectors, and its mere threat had an immediate effect. 
However, the full size of this effect only shows when the game is repeated for several rounds 
(Figure 1).  In the absence of punishment, contributions decrease; with punishment, they 
quickly increase to almost 100%. This happens if the groups stay together but, most 
significantly, even if the groups are newly formed between rounds, and players know that 
they will never meet a co-player twice. By inflicting punishment, they can conceivably turn a 
defector into a cooperator. However, punishers know that the future contributions of such a 
‘reformed’ player will exclusively benefit others. Punishment appears as altruistic act.   
 
This is a stunning outcome. Without sanctions, the public good, i.e. the tripling of the 
endowment, is not realised. With sanctions, it is, although selfish reckoning prescribes that 
costly punishment should not be delivered. In the absence of institutions, players are willing 
‘to take the law into their own hands’ (also known as ‘peer-punishing’). This enforces 
cooperation in many-player interactions between unrelated individuals, which is a remarkable 
trait of human societies, and surely an essential factor in our evolutionary history. 
 
SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 
 
The investigation of the interplay between mutual assistance and social enforcement is a 
booming enterprise. Economists use experimental games to study the effects of positive and 
negative incentives (i.e. reward and punishment) on our propensity to collaborate [6,7]; 
anthropologists visit small-scale societies to measure the culture-dependence and universality 
of  norms that enforce cooperation [8]; psychologists study the often sub-conscious cues 
eliciting emotions that lead to helping behaviour or moralistic aggression [9-11]; neurologists 
use magnetic resonance techniques to correlate social dilemmas with brain activities [12,13]; 
game theorists modify their utility functions to take account of non-monetary concerns 
[14,15]; biologists look for signs of  policing and sanctions in  bees  or bacteria [16,17]; and 
political scientists attempt to improve governance of  institutions promoting collective  
actions [18,19]. Trans-disciplinary dialogues are in full swing, although communication 
sometimes needs improving [20].  
 
The underlying questions concerning political creatures and human nature go back at least to 
Aristotle. The formal framework for discussing social dilemmas that arise with public goods 
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was provided by game theory [21]. As Olson  stated in 1964 in his ‘Logic of Collective 
Action’ [22], self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their group interest, except 
when prodded by incentives directed selectively towards individuals in the group, (i.e. 
punishing exploiters or rewarding contributors). In 1965, the biologist Hardin addressed the 
same issue in a highly influential Science paper on the Tragedy of the Commons [23], and 
offered as solution of the social dilemma: ‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’. This is 
also advocated in Hobbes’ Leviathan.  But how can the agreement be enforced? The role of 
sanctioning institutions, in our civilisation and in other societies, to uphold social norms and 
protect public goods has become an object of intense scrutiny [24].  
 
Providing selective incentives for collective action is itself a public good, of course, so that 
the prevalence of punishing (or rewarding) institutions seems to present a chicken-and-egg 
problem. “The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good” was the title of an 
experimental paper by Yamagishi (1986) studying the effect of costly punishment on 
contributions towards a collective benefit [25]. In the ‘nineties, a wide range of papers studied 
punishing and rewarding, usually in two-person games (Box 1). 
  
The basic finding in all those economic experiments is that most humans are not self-centred, 
but are other-regarding [27,28]. Their aim is not uniquely the maximization of their income.  
They are strongly motivated by emotions (“moral sentiments”, in the words of Adam Smith). 
 
Witness for example the Ultimatum game (Box 1): a Responder uniquely interested in income 
maximization should accept any positive offer, even the smallest. A similarly disposed 
Proposer should, therefore, make the minimal offer, and keep the rest of the sum. But the real 
outcome is vastly different. Most offers are close to a fair split; the rare unfair offers are 
mostly rejected. Dozens of experiments verified the robustness of this outcome.  In particular, 
in all ‘modern’ societies, some two-thirds of the offers are between 40% and 50% of the total 
sum; those <20% are few, and get usually rejected [26]. A vast collective effort of 
anthropological studies [8] was able to document cultural variation in small-scale societies: 
but even among the Machiguenga, an Amazonian population of hunter-gatherers, the mean 
offer was 26%; this record of unfairness is still a long way from the minimal offer predicted 
for selfish agents. 
 
The Ultimatum game is played in a group of two players only and looks, at first glance, 
distinct from the Public Goods game with Punishment: the players are in different roles, and 
each one has only one decision to make. But the rejection of an offer by the Responder is a 
costly punishment (less costly to the punisher if the offer is small, and hurting the Proposer all 
the more).   
 
The economic experiments displaying ‘Human Nature’ motivate both social psychologists 
and evolutionary biologists (as well as evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists) to 
study the proximal or ultimate causes (i.e. the how and the why of human cooperation). This  
review can  only give pointers to a literature drawing, in each field, on a rich tradition.  
 
ULTIMATE REASONS OF COSTLY PUNISHMENT 
 
Altruistic behaviour and selfish genes provide a favourite playground for theories on the 
evolution of cooperation, and have led to a rich tool-box (Box 2). Does this tool-box offer an 
explanation for our propensity to punish cheaters in public good interactions? How can the 
trait emerge, and how can it be maintained (Box 3)?   
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Two evolutionary approaches to these questions are based on group selection, and invoke 
selective group extinction [34,35]. It seems likely that intergroup conflict was frequent in 
early human history, and had a large impact on shaping human instincts. If a group is 
threatened with extinction, solidarity soars, as people can tell who have experienced bombing 
raids. Courage, comradeship, bonding and the readiness to risk, or sacrifice, one’s own life for 
the group must have been shaped by such recurrent episodes from the past. 
It seems less compelling that this also moulded the behaviour observed in economic games, 
which is based on common concerns for fairness or reciprocation.  
 
Several other models [36-38] exploit the fact that, if populations are not well-mixed, but 
interact only locally, benefits through punishment are easier to achieve. According to one 
view, which defines relatedness by statistical correlation rather than common descent, both 
group selection and localized interaction can be translated into a kin selection framework 
[39]. But as stressed in ref. [40], the relatedness of social partners counts less than the effect 
of the punishment dealt out by an individual on the cooperation received by that individual, 
and this can be due to facultative adjustment, especially in small groups.    
 
In a different approach [41], costly punishment is explained by two additional factors: (i) a 
tendency to copy not only the most successful strategy, but also the most frequent; and (ii) 
‘second-order punishment’ directed at those who contribute, but fail to punish. Whether 
‘higher-order punishment’ really occurs is a moot point, as experiments have failed to show 
evidence for it [42]. However, we surely are conformists. But this tendency to swim with the 
majority, which helps to stabilize a widespread trait, works against its gaining a foothold in a 
population dominated by another strategy. 
 
A similar problem besets another model [43], which assumes that, with some small 
probability, players defect when they learn that their co-players do not punish. This requires 
information about the others, and a dose of opportunism. Again, a population of punishers 
cannot be invaded by exploiters, whether first or second order. But conversely, punishers are 
unable to invade a population of defectors. Thus, the emergence of punishers remains an open 
issue.  
 
Fowler [44] suggests a possible solution, which exploits the fact that, in many public good 
interactions, players are not obliged to participate. Imagine that players randomly sampled 
from the population are offered to participate in a Public Good game, or to stand aside. Those 
who participate, and find themselves in a group of cooperators, will increase their payoff; 
those who participate, but land in a group of defectors, will lose. The collective effort is thus a 
speculation whose success depends on the co-players. This model leads to the emergence of 
costly punishment, provided a group of two or more cooperators does better than the non-
participants [45,46]. If second-order exploiters manage to spread, defectors quickly take over 
and make the joint effort unattractive. But such episodes are rare and short; when only few are 
willing to participate in the public good game, cooperation and costly punishment re-appear, 
and dominate most of the time. Other things being equal, a voluntary Public Good game with 
Punishment is more likely to prosper than is a compulsory one.  
 
Once punishers have invaded and taken over, all factors mentioned before (conformism, 
reputation, etc.) can join in and stabilize the propensity to punish. Individual adaptation, in 
this model, is based on imitation rather than on inheritance. Similarly, the spread from one 
group to another is easier to conceive as cultural, rather than genetic. But once punishment is 
established, genetic selection will favour suitable cognitive or emotional  adaptations [47]. 
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These optimistic lines do not imply that all problems with costly punishment are solved. 
There are public good situations that require other models, for instance when participation is 
compulsory; the substantial percentage of unconditional defectors (or co-operators) remains 
unexplained; and so on. But group selection  is not the only alternative. 
 
However, this alternative is favoured by some experimentalists [48,49], because games with 
anonymous subjects eliminate all possible effects of relatedness, reputation, future 
interactions, or signalling. Hence, neither direct nor indirect reciprocity nor kin selection nor 
costly signalling is at work and thus, the reason for costly punishment has to be the only 
alternative left, namely group selection. This argument is in the venerable tradition of 
Sherlock Holmes: “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth”. But the experiments also eliminate group benefits [31]. This 
would be different if the players were told, for instance, that their group was one of several, 
and that the members of the group with smallest total payoff would lose all their earnings (a 
setup that is likely to promote cooperation even without punishment). But players know that 
they are an anonymous sample from a large population, and will disperse after one round of 
the game. On the other hand, such anonymity is a highly artificial condition, and many doubt 
that humans have evolved suitable adaptations. 
 
As Burnham and Johnson write [31]: ‘People may behave as if they were from the same 
evolutionarily relevant group, but in that case we may just as well assume that anonymous 
subjects behave as if they were related, or as if they were destined to meet again, or as if they 
are observed by others.’ Thus, kin selection, direct or indirect reciprocity, costly signalling as 
well as group selection, might all work. Nothing can be excluded out of hand. It could even be 
that, as in Agatha Christie’s Murder in the Orient Express, all suspects collude. Theoreticians 
tend to look for the most parsimonious explanation, but this principle need not be appropriate 
to the historical contingencies of human evolution.  
 
PROXIMATE CAUSES OF COSTLY PUNISHMENT 
 
 
It makes no sense to assume that Ultimatum games or Public Good games, in their clinical 
sterility, have shaped our evolution. But human behaviour in these games is based on evolved 
traits. The stark artificiality of economic experiments helps (as in physics or physiology) to 
reveal the mechanisms underlying these traits. 
 
It appears from cross-cultural studies that the readiness to inflict costly punishment on 
cheaters is a human universal [8]. It varies across societies, but is strongly correlated with 
altruistic behaviour, such as the readiness to help others in Dictator games. Brain imaging 
techniques show that, when players inflict costly punishment, special satisfaction-related 
zones in the dorsal striatum are activated, indicating physiological adaptations [13]. Both 
punishing and rewarding appear to be facets of the deep-seated human propensity to 
reciprocate good and bad, a propensity guided by reasoning and emotions, and based on 
heuristics and  cues. 
 
Two recurrent findings of experimental economics are, on one hand, the diversity within 
populations, and on the other hand, the flexibility of individuals. All populations appear to be 
polymorphic, with a substantial percentage displaying little reciprocation. If groups of ‘high 
trusters’ or ‘low trusters’ are assorted according to simple test questions, they achieve 
different levels of cooperation in Public Good games [25]. However, many humans can adapt 
quickly and fine-tune their actions to their social environment. Players do not merely respond 
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to the threat of punishment or the promise of a reward, but they update constantly, taking 
account of their experience [5]. If players are told that they will be re-matched with the same 
co-players, or that their decisions will be made known, they often change their behaviour, 
obviously motivated by concerns for longer-lasting interactions or for reputation [50-53]. 
Similarly, if they can opt out of the Public Good game, or back into it, they base their 
decisions on the current state of the population and adapt rapidly [54]. Voluntary participation 
elicits a greater readiness to cooperate [55].   
 
This alertness can misfire: it has been shown that by merely seeing the image of an eye, 
players can be motivated to increase donations substantially [56-58]. Such obvious 
maladaptions strongly support the hypothesis that our evolutionary legacy shapes our 
economic behaviour.  Similarly, cooperation can be increased by cues of reciprocity  or 
kinship [59]: a face with a family resemblance elicits more help. It is also well known that 
seemingly unimportant factors (for instance, a preference for Klee rather than Kandinsky)  
can establish a group identity among complete strangers and boost solidarity [60]. Even in the 
absence of cues, players could be influenced by the relevant concerns, at least in the sense of 
hedging their bets. (The tendency to invest roughly half in the first round of a Public good 
game could be such an insurance policy.) 
 
Our understanding of when and why subliminal factors can affect decision making is far from 
complete. Players can strongly react to an appropriate cue even when knowing that reality 
does not back it up. (An example often mentioned in discussions is the sexual arousal 
produced by centrefolds.)  In particular, the fear of punishment can be easily evoked. Under 
normal circumstances, the donations in the Dictator game (see Box 1) are smaller than in the 
Ultimatum game, because Proposers understand that low offers cannot be rejected. But if 
Proposers know that they will be informed of what the Responder thinks of their offer, they 
offer as much as with the Ultimatum [61]. Such purely symbolic punishment is not very 
costly any longer. It has been argued that a strong motive for cooperation and moral 
behaviour is the fear of punishment by supernatural spirits [62]. Superstitious maladaptations 
are widespread, possibly because they strongly promote conformism and obedience. 
 
Fear, shame, guilt and their converse, the elation and inner glow after a generous action, work 
to keep humans from cheating. Being cheated arouses anger, indignation and moral outrage, 
and often causes individuals to inflict costly punishment on defectors.  
  
 
However, reducing punishment to retaliatory motives and anger at norm-breakers might be 
premature. Recently, the Public Good experiment with Punishment was repeated, with the 
difference that the first stage (public good) was replaced by a lottery [63]. Players received 
randomly assigned sums (distributed as in the Fehr-Gächter experiment [4]) and then could 
inflict costly ‘punishment’ just as before, except that they were fully aware that their co-
players had done nothing wrong. Many chose to reduce the top earners’ income, producing an 
effect statistically undistinguishable from the reduction of the income of below-average 
contributors in the Public Good game with Punishment. Inequality arouses negative emotions.  
 
If the Public Good game is repeated, but this time with a fee:fine ratio of 1:1 (the punisher has 
to pay as much as the punished), then the difference between the two players’ payoffs is not 
altered by punishment (although payoff variance can be reduced). Nevertheless, contributors 
punish defectors vigorously, and the threat of punishment boosts contributions [64].  
Significantly, whereas in the 1:3 treatment defectors sometimes impose sanctions (on 
defectors and co-operators alike), this rarely happens in the 1:1 treatment. Defectors appear to 
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be little affected by fairness norms. By contrast, cooperators (who usually punish only 
defectors) more than double their efforts on imposing fines, obviously willing to incur higher 
costs to inflict the ‘just’ retribution on wrong-doers. 
 
THE LIMITATIONS OF PEER-PUNISHMENT 
 
Although punishment works to boost cooperation, it can also be counterproductive.  
It often lowers the average income in Public Good games, despite raising the average level of 
contributions. In games of trust, or games involving rewards, adding the threat of punishment 
can decrease the menaced player’s willingness to cooperate [65].  In a particularly elegant set 
of experiments, it has been shown that, if players of a Public Good game are offered before 
each round the choice between the versions with or without Punishment, many tend first to 
shun negative incentives. They need a few rounds to learn to switch to the version with 
sanctions [66]. Together with the theoretical model of a Public Good game with Punishment, 
based on voluntary participation [46], this provides a neat application of Hardin’s principle 
‘Mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’ [23].  
 
Punishment is not the only way to enforce cooperation; harassing those having access to a 
resource [67], chasing shirkers [68] or sabotaging the attempts of cheaters [16], are different 
examples, and can also be found in other animals, such as mammals, fishes or insects. But 
humans, with their cognitive capacities for individual recognition, temporal discounting, 
memory, empathy and language, are uniquely gifted to develop the proximal mechanisms 
needed for reciprocation and in particular for punishment.  
 
On the other hand, it needs to be stressed that peer-punishment seems relatively rare in real 
life (in contrast to experiments under anonymity). It can be costly indeed. In small scale 
societies, or village life, reputation may play a more pervasive role. It is easier to gossip 
behind the back of a bully than to confront him. Undermining a good reputation is an 
inexpensive but ominous form of sanctioning, which may eventually lead to ostracism, i.e. 
exclusion from the market for trustworthy partners. In large societies, peer-punishment is also 
rare, and repressed by the institutions upholding law and order. Both the pervasive market 
economy for reliable partners, and the step from peer-punishment to the establishment of 
sanctioning institutions, deserve closer future investigation. 
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Box 1: Game Zoo: a brief lexicon of two-person games 
 
Many experimental two-person games are related to the issues of public goods [26]. 
Typically, the players are anonymous, and are endowed with a certain amount of money 
beforehand (e.g. a show-up fee). They are asked to make their decision after having 
understood the rules of the game and being assigned to the role of Proposer and Responder (or 
Donor and Recipient).  
 
Gift Giving: in some sense, an atom of social interaction. The Donor decides whether to pay 
one dollar to confer a benefit of three dollars on the Recipient. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma: the mother of all cooperation games is played in many variations. In 
one particularly transparent set-up, both players engage in a Gift Giving Game with each 
other. When players decide simultaneously, this is similar to a two-player Public Good game. 
If both cooperate by sending a gift to the other, both gain two dollars. But sending a gift costs 
one dollar, so that the best reply to whatever the co-player decides is not to cooperate (i.e. to 
defect). If both players defect, however, they gain nothing. 
Ultimatum:  the experimenter assigns a certain sum, and the Proposer can offer a share of it 
to the Responder. If the Responder (who knows the sum) accepts, the sum is split accordingly 
between the two players, and the game is over. If the Responder declines, the experimenter 
withdraws the money. Again, the game is over: but this time, none of the two players gets 
anything.  
Dictator: same as Ultimatum, except that the Responder cannot reject the offer. 
Trust: in a first stage, the Proposer can confer a certain benefit on the Responder, as in the 
Gift Giving Game. In the second stage, the Responder can decide how much of it to return to 
the Proposer. This is similar to the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (when first one 
player acts as Donor and then the other). 
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: the two players interact for several rounds of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Usually, they are not told beforehand when the interaction will be over, so as to 
avoid ‘last round effects’ (defection motivated by the fact that the co-player cannot retaliate). 
Indirect Reciprocity: in a large population of players, two players are sampled at random 
and play the Gift Giving game or the (non-repeated) Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This is 
repeated again and again. The players know that they interact only once, so that retaliation is 
impossible. 
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Box 2: Tools for Fitness:  a semantic guide to the evolution of cooperation 
 
Punishing and rewarding are responses to previous actions. In principle, reciprocation can 
only occur as the second stage of an interaction; however, the first stage of the interaction (the 
contribution to the public good, or the offer in the Ultimatum Game) is often affected by the 
expectation of a return. The challenge is to explain that return (i.e. the second stage).  
 
Reciprocity operates even with third parties. This is called indirect reciprocation and comes 
in two flavours. A bystander watching Joe harm Bill (or help Bill) is likely to harm 
(respectively help) Joe, in turn: that is vicarious reciprocity. Conversely, an individual who 
has been harmed, or helped,  by some agent Ted,  can vent his anger, or his gratitude, on some 
passerby, Bob: that is misdirected reciprocity. These effects have been documented in 
experiments [29, 30]. For instance, the propensity of a bystander to punish defectors in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game is high, except if both players defected and, thus, in a sense, 
performed the punishment themselves. 
 
The emotionally driven disposition to return good with good, and bad with bad, is called 
strong reciprocity by a group of researchers who co-operated on a vast effort to study 
economic games in small-scale societies. Despite substantial differences in their views, they 
are often perceived as an in-group around the banner of strong reciprocity [31].  
 
Reciprocation is usually costly, whether it is altruistic (rewarding) or spiteful (punishing). 
Evolutionary biologists have to understand its adaptive value, and show that such behaviour is 
(on average) not fitness-reducing after all. The classical approaches invoke interactions 
between kin, or mutual benefits to cooperating individuals [20]. Both approaches rely on 
positive assortment between individuals conferring help. The explanation is genetic in one 
case, and economic in the other.  
 
Kin selection operates if a loss in direct fitness (the own reproductive success) is  
compensated by a gain in indirect fitness (the reproductive success of related 
individuals)[32,33].  
 
Mutual benefits to cooperating individuals can accrue, for instance, if the 
same two players engage in a long chain of give-and-take, as with direct reciprocity, or if 
reputation effects enable cooperators to channel benefits towards those individuals who are 
benefiting others, as with indirect reciprocity. Costly signalling can be subsumed under this 
heading, if players who are able to signal higher value (because they can afford to 
contribution) are preferentially chosen as partners or mates and, thus, obtain benefits in return.  
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Box 3: Punishing Logic: the evolutionary problems raised by costly punishment 
 
Punishers raise two evolutionary riddles. They cannot invade; and they can be invaded.  
 
A minority of punishers invading a population of defectors would have to punish left and 
right. Because each act of punishment is costly, punishers would suffer heavily, whereas the 
defectors would barely be affected. Hence, punishers would be at a disadvantage, and soon 
eliminated from the population. 
 
Conversely, suppose that a population is dominated by punishers. Defectors, in that case, 
cannot invade: a minority of defectors would have to bear the full brunt of punishment from 
the majority, which more than offsets their gain from not contributing. This is a bi-stable 
situation:  defectors cannot invade punishers, punishers cannot invade defectors. But suppose 
that a new type enters the population, one who contributes, but does not punish. Such a type 
can easily arise through recombining traits. The newcomers do just as well as the resident 
punishers and, thus, can slowly spread by neutral drift. In fact, if occasionally some defectors 
entered the population (to be promptly eliminated by the punishers), the new type would do 
better than the punishers, by economizing on the cost of punishment. This new type is a 
second-order exploiter, free-riding on the sanctions provided by the punishers. Hence, it will 
spread: and this means that eventually, there will be too few punishers to keep the defectors at 
bay. Thus, second-order exploiters sabotage the enforcement of contributions to the public 
good game in the long run and, therefore, sap the basis for the punishers, and for themselves: 
both contributing types will be displaced by defectors. 
 
A remedy coming to mind is ‘second-order punishment’ (i.e. in punishing not only the ‘first 
order exploiters’ who fail to contribute, but also the ‘second order exploiters’ who contribute, 
but fail to punish). However, this could give rise to ‘third order exploiters’ and so on. If 
punishers of a sufficiently high order dominate the population, there will be few defectors 
and, hence, few occasions, for lower-order punishers to reveal their limitations to their fiercer 
brethren. Thus, they would rarely be selected against, and could spread by neutral drift, 
sapping the system. Clearly, higher-order punishers cannot gain a foothold in a population of 
defectors.    
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Box 4: The carrot: the role of rewards as incentives for cooperation 
 
Investigations comparing negative with positive incentives (i.e. the carrot with the stick), 
show that rewards are considerably less efficient than punishment, at least for the games 
considered here, where the public good is a linear function of the number of contributors. 
Positive incentives become costly, but negative cheap, if success is fully achieved, i.e. all 
cooperate [10,69-71].  
 
Andreoni et al. [72] studied four treatments of a Proposer-Responder game in which the 
Proposer had to choose how much to share of a given sum. Depending on the treatment, the 
Responder had subsequently the possibility, (i) to reward or to punish the Proposer; (ii) only 
to reward; (iii) only to punish; or (iv) neither/nor. Treatment (iv) reduces to the Dictator game 
(Box 1); treatment (iii) with the punishing option differs from the Ultimatum Game (Box 1) 
because the Responder has more freedom in choosing the proper sanction.   
 
Rewards alone prove ineffective. Punishment, by contrast, often induces offers close to 50%. 
Adding the possibility of rewarding yields a remarkable outcome:  half the offers are >50%, 
and more than a quarter of the Proposers offer 100%. The corresponding reward is half of 
that. Punishment is hardly affected by the availability of rewards, but rewarding is 
considerably more pronounced if there is no possibility of punishment. 
 
A particularly interesting system of incentives is considered in [73] and [74]. Between rounds 
of the Public Good game without Punishment, the population engages in pair-wise 
interactions of indirect reciprocity (Box 1). Since players tend preferentially to help those who 
contributed to the public good, this effectively provides rewards which are not costly because 
those who reward earn a good reputation and thus benefit in later rounds of the indirect 
reciprocity game. If in addition to indirect reciprocity, the players have an opportunity to 
directly peer-punish those who do not contribute, they use this opportunity less often, but in a 
more focussed way, see Figure 1 [75].  Costly punishment and rewarding through indirect 
reciprocity combine very efficiently to boost cooperation in group interactions. 
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Fig. 1 Learning to exploit vs. teaching to cooperate. In [4], groups of players engage in six 
rounds of Public Good without Punishment, followed by six rounds with Punishment.  
Shown are the average contributions per round. The groups are newly formed between 
rounds, so that players never interact with a co-player twice. It should be stressed that in the 
rounds with punishment, the average income is usually below that without punishment: 
punishment is costly. But in later rounds, when most players cooperate, punishment should be 
rare. Ideally, it is no longer needed except as a threat. This should yield a stable and 
economically efficient collaboration. (After Fehr and Gächter [4]). 
  
  
Fig.2 Peer punishment vs. reputation-building (after Rockenbach and Milinski [75]).  In 
the PUN treatment, player can punish their co-players after every round of a Public Good 
game. In the PUN&IR treatment, they engage, in addition, in several rounds of indirect 
reciprocity (see Box 1) after each round of the Public Good game. Such rounds permit to 
reward players who have contributed to the public good. By withholding a possible donation 
in the indirect reciprocity game, players can effectively sanction free riders without paying a 
cost. This reduces the amount of direct, costly punishment (a), but does not eliminate it. 
Rather, the direct punishment is now more focussed towards free-riders (b), and considerably 
more efficient in boosting contributions (c).  
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